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  "Everything that can be invented has been invented," or so the United States Patent and Trademark (PTO) Director,
Charles Duell, thought in 1899. [FN1] Duell's ironic statement preceded discovery of most of the modern
technological conveniences on which society currently relies.  Largely due to Duell's prediction, when patent
applications for devices such as the telegraph and telephone arrived at the PTO, examiners had no idea what to do
with these new contraptions; to avoid the hassle of learning the new technology and personally fostering its
progression through a cumbersome government agency process, PTO examiners quickly declared the inventions
unpatentable subject matter. [FN2]  Until recently, the PTO treated patent applications for computer- implemented
business methods in much the same way.  These inventions were considered unpatentable for three reasons: (1)
algorithms, as basic scientific ideas, were considered unpatentable subject matter; (2) the judicially-created
physicality requirement was not satisfied; and (3) the business method exception barred patentability.  Internet
patents are especially at risk of encountering these exceptions because they use algorithms to perform certain
functions, they require use of the Internet as a means to implement the invention (thus the physicality requirement is
not satisfied) and they exemplify methods of doing business.  In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., [FN3] a 1998 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) eliminated or
significantly narrowed all three patentability requirements, opening the door for computer-implemented business
method patents. [FN4]
  *254 The decision came at an opportune time, since the Internet currently generates more than $300 billion in
yearly revenue and has created more than one million jobs. [FN5]  Knowing that these figures are just the tip of the
iceberg, [FN6] corporate giants are rushing to obtain a piece of this lucrative market.  For example, almost half of
IBM's 2,657 utility patents were for network-related software inventions. [FN7]  Until recently, obtaining patents on
computer software which furthered a business method was risky because the patent applications had to claim the
hardware on which the program operated or the medium on which it is stored rather than claim the software itself.
Also, the claims almost always had to be written in means plus function language, [FN8] leading to very narrow
coverage.  Further, the validity of such patents was uncertain and issuance of the patent constituted public disclosure
so corporations often lost their trade secret protection. [FN9]  In the midst of the information revolution spurred by
the Internet, many prominent software manufacturers found the inability to patent software- implemented business
methods directly and with certainty debilitating.  Such manufacturers lobbied the legislature to tweak the laws
concerning patentable subject matter.  Their *255 efforts were rewarded when, in 1996, the PTO took heed of their
demands and altered the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) to minimize limitations on patenting
business method computer software. [FN10] However, since the MPEP is merely persuasive authority, much
uncertainty existed as to the impact these amendments would have on patent practice.
  Two years later, in State Street, the Federal Circuit alleviated much of this uncertainty by interpreting the MPEP
amendments. [FN11]  To the joy of software corporations and patent practitioners alike, the court eliminated the
business method exception, abolished the physicality requirement, and greatly reduced the effect of the algorithm
exception. [FN12]  In the two years since the decision issued, the United States Supreme Court denied the PTO's
appeal for certiorari [FN13] and a different Federal Circuit panel affirmed the reasoning used in State Street. [FN14]
Thus, the door to a new field of patentable subject matter appears to have been opened.
  Since patents typically have a two to three year gestation period before issuance, the full-blown ramifications of
these decisions remains uncertain, and the cloud of uncertainty raised by State Street will likely not settle for another
three to five years.  Patent practitioners and legal commentators are split as to the effects occasioned by these recent
events.  Some argue that society is at the threshold of a new era in which businesses will seek patents as often as
they write contracts. [FN15]  Others suggest that the *256 decisions merely judicially codified a practice that had
been present for years and thus will have little, if any, effect on how business is conducted. [FN16]
  This Article will (1) review the historical context of the State Street decision in light of the general tenets and
policies underlying patent law; (2) survey the opinions of leading authorities concerning possible future
consequences arising from the decision; and (3) discuss the author's opinion that the crucial issue in the wake of
State Street is determining the proper scope of patent protection for computer-implemented business methods.
I A Summary of Patent Law
  In 1787, the Framers of the United States Constitution adopted without debate a clause suggested by
inventor/legislator Thomas Jefferson which provided that "Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." [FN17]  This clause, and the resulting Patent Act of 1793, embodied
Jefferson's belief that "ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement." [FN18]  There are two major policy
arguments supporting the government's willingness to allow an inventor a limited monopoly: the patent prospect
encourages inventors to (1) invest in and conduct research and (2) publish and disclose scientific advancements
made in the course of such research.  Thus, in exchange for full public disclosure of a useful invention, the inventor
receives the right to exclude others from the manufacture, sale, offer for sale, or *257 importation of the invention.
[FN19]  A full disclosure of the invention and the scientific principles behind it [FN20] enables the public to further
experiment with the disclosed technology, and thereby assures the United States predominance in the lucrative field
of scientific advancement. [FN21]
  Application for a patent must be made within one year of the first offer for sale or public disclosure. [FN22]  The
application must contain an enabling disclosure, which discloses the best method for practicing the invention, as
well as a set of claims which define the scope of the claimed legal rights.  A PTO examiner will evaluate the
application to determine: (1) whether the invention is patentable subject matter; [FN23] (2) whether the invention is
sufficiently novel; [FN24] (3) whether the invention conveys some utility; [FN25] *258 and (4) whether the
invention is so obvious that anyone with ordinary skill in the art could have created it. [FN26] Once these
patentability hurdles are overcome, the PTO issues the application as a patent and the inventor or his assignee have a
legal monopoly on the invention for twenty years from the filing date of the application. [FN27] In the event of
infringement of these rights, patent owners may seek enforcement of the patent in a federal district court and may
obtain preliminary or permanent injunctions, damages for lost profits, attorney's fees, and treble damages. [FN28]
II The Patentability Objections to Software Implemented Business Methods
  Faced with patent applications for software-implemented business methods, PTO Examiners historically denied
patentability on the grounds of unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. ß  101. [FN29]  Specifically, examiners
made three objections: (1) that *259 the physicality requirement was not satisfied and thus the invention was not
patentable; (2) that the application was in violation of the business method exception to patentability and was
consequently outside the scope of patentable subject matter; and (3) that the application was merely a mathematical
algorithm and therefore unpatentable subject matter.
A. The Physicality Requirement
  Prior to State Street, the predominant method of claiming software was to claim a series of steps to be performed
on a computer using means plus function language.  Examiners would attempt to categorize these steps in one of
three ways: (1) a manipulation of abstract ideas; (2) a solution to a mathematical problem; or (3) a process for
transforming physical material into a different state to achieve a practical application or an invention which was
performed on a physical apparatus. [FN30]  If the steps were categorized as either of the first two categories, the
invention was deemed unpatentable subject matter. [FN31]  However, if the steps fell into the third category, the
invention was patentable because it had physical attributes. [FN32]  Thus, computer software became a physical
apparatus when run on a general purpose computer [FN33] and claimed using means plus function language because
the algorithm was linked to otherwise patentable subject matter; therefore the invention was considered a machine.
[FN34]  Because "the principal function of today's business systems is number crunching," satisfaction of the
physicality requirement was difficult, if not impossible. [FN35]  Consequently, corporations often argued that
"[h]aving a physicality requirement only retards the advance of computer technology rather than encourag[ing] it."
[FN36]
*260 B. The Business Methods Exception
  The court in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. [FN37] created the business method exception when they
ruled that a method to deter fraud among waiters was unpatentable subject matter because it was a mere business
method. [FN38]  Commentators argue that the ruling was an overly broad manner of stating that the physicality
requirement was not satisfied in the instant case and thus the invention was an idea; further, "[n]o mere abstraction,
no idea, however brilliant, can be the subject of a patent irrespective of the means designed to give it effect." [FN39]
Consequently, patent practitioners have argued that Hotel Security created a "phantasmic body of law." [FN40] The
fact that no court has ever denied a patent based solely on the business method exception supports this assertion.
[FN41]
C. The Mathematical Algorithm Exception
  The mathematical algorithm exception states that mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter
because they are merely ideas and ideas are not patentable.  Because software is essentially "a sequence of logical
instructions that enable a computer to solve a problem or provide a desired output from input data . . . operat[ing]
solely on the basis of numerical calculations," [FN42] logical instructions constitute mathematical algorithms and
are not subject to patent protection.
D. A Historical Overview of the Case Law Regarding Patentability of Software- Implemented Methods
  A summary of the judicial decisions concerning the patenting of computer software "is really the story of a multi-
decade long, *261 titanic struggle waged between the executive and judicial branches" over the scope of 35 U.S.C. ß
101, which defines patentable subject matter. [FN43]  The struggle began in the 1960s when the PTO, fully aware of
the rapid advances in computer technology, was reticent to issue computer software patents because it feared the
difficulty that shouldering the burden of reviewing such applications would represent in light of the dearth of
qualified examiners, the financial instability of the PTO, and the floodgate of patents that would flow into the office.
The PTO knew that it would need a federal subsidy to handle the inflow of software applications and also knew that,
in the midst of a political climate where the government emphasized antitrust law enforcement and downplayed the
encouragement of innovation, such a subsidy was highly unlikely. [FN44]  As a result, the PTO adopted a strong
anti-computer software patent position.  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), [FN45] since it was
protected from the fiscal and budgetary problems that constrained the PTO, offered a friendlier environment for
software patent applications. [FN46]  In 1966, the executive branch attempted to resolve the tension created by these
differing opinions by conducting an independent study of the patent system. [FN47] After twenty months of study,
the President's Commission on the *262 Patent System rejected the proposal to grant patent protection to computer
software because:
    The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of a lack of a classification technique
and the requisite search files.  Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic
because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs
would be tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent.
  It is noted that the creation of [computer] programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the
absence of patent protection and that copyright protection for programs is presently available. [FN48]
  In 1968, the CCPA heard "the first significant judicial decision to consider the subject-matter patentability of
computer program-related inventions." [FN49]  The CCPA held that the fact that a useful process could alternatively
be carried out by a process of mental steps did not preclude patent protection. [FN50]  Thus, the decision opened the
door for the patentability of novel math processes, such as algorithms.  However, the door was quickly slammed
shut when, on rehearing, the court declared all claims unpatentable for failure to meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
ß  112. [FN51]  The CCPA again attempted to open the door to patentability for software when it held that
programmed computers constituted statutory subject matter. [FN52]  In 1970, the court stated that when considering
the patentability of a process with many steps, "it is immaterial to the question whether the combination is a
statutory 'process' that individual steps are old." [FN53]  Finally, in 1971, the court reached a high watermark for
showing its support for the patentability of software related inventions by allowing *263 claims that were directed
solely to data processing. [FN54]
  Frustrated with the CCPA's trend toward patentability, the PTO appealed its next case to the Supreme Court.
[FN55]  In Gottschalk v. Benson, [FN56] the PTO argued that software implemented processes and mathematical
algorithms were, at their core, a new category of technology that fell outside of 35 U.S.C. ß  101.  Further, the PTO
reminded the Court that it did not have properly trained examiners or an adequate body of prior art to examine the
new technology. [FN57]  The Court found for the PTO and, in dicta, stated that it was within Congress's sole
dominion to amend 35 U.S.C. ß  101 to include the new technology. [FN58]  The effect of this decision was that if
Congress altered the statutory language, it would effectively be forced to grant a PTO request for money to
implement the change. [FN59]  Also, the Court was careful not to state that software-related inventions were per se
unpatentable. [FN60]
  Because the Court left undiscussed its underlying motives, Benson created a state of confusion.  Further, Benson
failed to define "algorithm" and reserved for the CCPA the arduous task of creating a workable definition.  Over the
next four years, the CCPA formulated the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for determining both a definition of algorithm
and a clear test for software patentability.  The first case to aid in formulating this test was In *264 re Freeman,
[FN61] in which the CCPA introduced a two-part test for software application patentability: (1) does the claim recite
an algorithm and (2) if so, does the claim entirely preempt the algorithm? [FN62]  This test was applied in In re
Flook, [FN63] wherein the CCPA held that a mathematical algorithm plus the step of using the solution of the
algorithm to update a process alarm limit was patentable. [FN64]  However, the claims in Flook were deemed
unpatentable on another basis. [FN65]  The second portion of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was added in 1980
when the CCPA held that "[i]f it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to
define structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim . . . or to refine or limit claim steps . . ., the
claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under ß  101." [FN66]  Thus, the court held that if the
claim's end product was a number, it was unpatentable; however, if the end product was a physical result, it was
patentable. [FN67]  The final step of the test was determined in In re Abele when the CCPA stated that "if the claim
would be 'otherwise statutory,' albeit inoperative or less useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise presents
statutory subject matter when the algorithm is included." [FN68]  Therefore, the resulting test for patentability of
algorithms was as follows: the court first determined whether the invention recited a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or mental step; if none was found, then the subject matter was not excluded by the algorithm exception.
However, if an algorithm, formula, or mental step was involved, the court considered the second prong: whether the
invention involved the application of the algorithm to specific physical elements or processes in such a way that the
claimed application of the algorithm would wholly preempt its use. [FN69]  If preemption was found, the invention
qualified as unpatentable subject matter under the algorithm exception.
  While quite strict, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test suggested that some computer software was patentable subject
matter.  The *265 practical effect of the test was that claims directed to an apparatus or process including an
algorithm and carrying out a function were patentable. [FN70]  As a result, computer software patents were
disguised as hardware patents, often using means plus function language.  Critics found this test awkward because it
required dissection of the claims into algorithmic and non-algorithmic components, a process directly at odds with
the patent rule that claims should be read as a whole [FN71] and the analyzing party must determine whether some
or all of the language of the claim constituted a mathematical algorithm. [FN72]
  With these recent decisions, the CCPA was beginning to gain a lead in the battle over software patentability.
Several events in the 1980s cemented their victory.  President Ronald Reagan took office in 1980.  His
administration ended the era of antitrust dominance and recognized that innovation was a critical American
"product." [FN73]  To strengthen the patent system, Reagan's administration established the Federal Circuit to foster
uniform patent law. [FN74]  Thus, by 1981, the historically feared influx of patent applications for software was not
as tremendous a concern because the Reagan administration's support of the PTO suggested that it would be capable
of obtaining the funds necessary to handle the increased workload. [FN75]  Also, an overhaul of the PTO fee
structure enabled it to become fully self-funded. [FN76]  Finally, the computer software industry had sufficiently
developed *266 to create a pool of skilled programmers who could be recruited as examiners. [FN77]
  As a consequence of these practical changes, the Federal Circuit issued broader pro-patent rulings, including
Diamond v. Chakrabarty's oft quoted "Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun
that is made by man."' [FN78]  In 1994, the Federal Circuit all but discarded the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for
software patentability when it proposed a new test which simply considered the claimed invention as a whole and
determined whether it covered a useful application of technology or whether it was directed to a disembodied
mathematical concept, law of nature, or abstract idea. [FN79]  Computer programs embodied in floppy discs were
declared patentable subject matter in In re Beauregard. [FN80]  Thus, while the trend was to allow patents for
computer software, "[i]n the wake of these cases, patent practitioners were left with a series of convoluted rules to
guide them in preparing patent applications directed to computer software." [FN81]
  In order to facilitate the patenting of computer software, the PTO released The Examination Guidelines for
Computer Software (1996 Guidelines) in 1996, which minimized limitations on patenting business method computer
software. [FN82]  However, *267 since the guidelines were merely persuasive authority, uncertainty still existed as
to the impact these amendments would have on patent practice. [FN83]  Thus, the stage was set for the Federal
Circuit to once and for all clarify the issues relating to software patentability.
III State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.
  On March 9, 1993, Signature Financial Group Inc. (Signature), an administration and accounting agent for mutual
funds, obtained a patent entitled "Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configurations."
[FN84]  The patent contained six apparatus claims written in means plus function language and claimed an
investment system that worked on a personal computer. [FN85]  Specifically, the program allowed mutual funds
(spokes) to pool their assets into an investment portfolio (hub) organized as a partnership.  The software allowed
daily computation of various factors including each spoke's percentage share of the hub's assets and expenses.
[FN86]  As a result of the program, the individual mutual funds realized various administrative and tax advantages.
State Street Bank, a mutual fund *268 powerhouse, commanding forty-four percent of the value of the U.S. mutual
fund market, and with yearly revenues of $3.5 billion, [FN87] attempted to negotiate a license with Signature.  Such
negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful.  State Street Bank then challenged the validity of the patent.
  Since Signature's patent was issued prior to the 1996 Guidelines andAlappat, the issue in State Street was whether
patents not in conformance with the 1996 Guidelines, but prosecuted in good faith, would be upheld. [FN88] The
district court granted State Street Bank's summary judgment motion, stating that Signature's patent was invalid under
the mathematical algorithm and business method exceptions. [FN89]  In so deciding, the court used the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test.  The court concluded that the apparatus was designed as a means for solving a mathematical
problem with no physical activity sufficient to warrant patentability. [FN90]  Commentators speculate that the
decision was based largely on the fact that the claims were deemed to be so broad that they "foreclose[d] virtually
any computer-implemented accounting method necessary to manage this type of financial structure." [FN91]  While
perhaps true, this objection falls under a ß ß  102, 103, or 112 analysis rather than the patentable subject matter
analysis implemented. [FN92]
  After a year and a half of consideration, the Federal Circuit held that the Signature patent was valid. [FN93]  In so
doing, the Federal Circuit made three important rulings: the court significantly limited the mathematical algorithm
analysis, greatly eroded the physicality requirement, and eliminated the business methods exception.
  First, the court addressed the mathematical algorithm exception.  *269 The court stated that only those algorithms
that are nothing more than abstract ideas are precluded from patent protection. [FN94]  If reduced to an application
with a "useful, concrete, and tangible result," the invention is patentable. [FN95]  Further, the court allowed that "the
transformation of data . . . by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price,
constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm . . . ." [FN96]  Because the useful result could be
expressed in numbers such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss, the decision also effectively eliminated the
physicality prerequisite for patent protection. [FN97]  Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he question of whether a
claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a
claim is directed to--process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter--but rather on the essential
characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility." [FN98]  Thus, the court eradicated the
emphasis placed on process versus apparatus claims.  Additionally, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test of software
patentability was determined to have "little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject
matter." [FN99]  Instead, a practical utility test, whereby an invention is patentable subject matter if it produces a
useful, concrete, and tangible result, would be used to determine patentability. [FN100]
  Finally, the court discussed the business method exception.  Quoting Judge Newman from In re Schrader, the court
characterized the business method exception as "an unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject
matter in Section 101, that [should] be discarded as error-prone, redundant, and obsolete." [FN101]  Thus, the court
officially laid this "ill-conceived *270 exception to rest." [FN102]  In doing so, the court relied upon the Patent and
Trademark 1996 Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions which states that "[c]laims should not be
categorized as methods of doing business.  Instead[,] such claims should be treated like any other process claims."
[FN103]  The court stated that neither it nor its predecessor, the CCPA, had ever relied on the exception as the
primary ground for rendering an invention unpatentable. [FN104]
  Thus, after State Street, the path to patentability of software-implemented business methods appeared unobstructed.
However, some uncertainty still existed as to whether the decision would be overturned by the Supreme Court or
narrowed by future Federal Circuit panels.  Both concerns seem to have been unfounded since the holding of State
Street survived intense scrutiny in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., in which a different Federal Circuit
panel affirmed the State Street holding. [FN105]  Also, the Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari petitions in
both cases suggests that it has deferred the task of interpreting the scope of ß  101 to the Federal Circuit. [FN106]
IV A Discussion of the Potential Long-Term Effects of the State Street Decision
  Since its August 1998 release, critics, patent attorneys and business professionals have been debating the effect that
State Street will have on American business.  Attorney Barry Rein feels that State Street marks the beginning of "a
new era in banking and *271 finance." [FN107] "Overnight . . . financial institutions have awoken to find their basic
products now subject to the patent system." [FN108]  Attorney Robert Kunstadt seems to agree.  He predicts that
State Street "will affect every company operating in this country" and "Madison Avenue will be fundamentally
altered." [FN109]
A. Opinions Suggesting that the Hype of State Street Exceeds the Substance
  Many prominent patent professionals assert that State Street will have little long-term effect on the landscape of
patent law.  Renee Deger asserts that the ruling basically just sewed up the gaps in the law created by the software
explosion. [FN110]  Further, Deger and others point out that the PTO has already issued approximately 20,000
computer-related method patents [FN111] and the Federal Circuit has upheld the validity of a number of these
patents. [FN112]  For example, the PTO issued a patent to Merrill Lynch for a securities cash management system in
1982 and the patent was upheld by the Federal Circuit in 1983. [FN113]
  Further, many commentators note that interest in patenting computer- implemented business methods will be short-
lived because the benefits of patent protection fail to outweigh the incumbent costs of obtaining a patent. Business
methods have a short market time, [FN114] thus, time-consuming [FN115] and expensive [FN116] *272 patent
protection may not be obtained until after the market life of the innovation has expired, thereby leaving a company
with a worthless patent.  This is especially true of quantitative fund managers whose methods are continually in flux
and whose innovations are obsolete within four to five years. [FN117]  Also, many business method innovations are
ineffective or unpopular and thus do not generate sufficient revenue to allow companies to patent all new
innovations they create.  Other critics argue that computer software patents are redundant because most innovations
are already protected by trade secret law. [FN118] Hence, obtaining a patent is nothing more than a very expensive
marketing gimmick.  Also, patent protection will most likely protect one's interest only in the United States since
most foreign jurisdictions have statutes implementing the business method exception. [FN119]  As a result, large
companies with international markets who can afford to prosecute a patent before the PTO will not be greatly served
by obtaining patent protection. Additionally, patents like the one issued to Signature fail to offer significant
protection since the patents are written very narrowly and thus infringement is easily circumvented.  Also, many
patents are revoked once it is *273 discovered that the patented material was already in use but was protected by
trade secret.
B. The Author's Predicted Long-Term Effect of State Street
  It is more likely that, rather than quickly dying away, the furor over State Street will result in a flood of patent
application filings for software- implemented business methods.  Recent filings support this assertion; the PTO
granted over 20,000 patents for software-related inventions in 1998, the year the decision issued, representing a forty
percent increase. [FN120] Similarly, nine Internet patents were granted in 1989, as compared to more than 1,500 in
1998. [FN121]  History also supports this assertion.  In 1981, when the Federal Circuit ruled that genetically
engineered organisms could be patented, the PTO granted over 300 patents in that group the next year. [FN122]
Similarly, in 1994, when the Federal Circuit ruled that computer- implemented technology was patentable,
Microsoft received only twenty-six patents. [FN123]  In 1998, it received 342. [FN124]  Additionally, the country is
experiencing one of the strongest continued economies in recent history.  One benefit of this economy is that
consumers and corporations have had money to invest and inventors are using that money to invest in their
technology by securing patent rights.  Thus, patent applications in general are at an all-time high. [FN125]
Specifically, 250,000 patent applications were filed in 1998 and 154,579 of those issued. [FN126]  Finally, one
cannot underestimate the amount of money the Internet is currently generating. "Growth rates on the Internet are
stupefying . . . .  So anyone that [has] a patent that will stand up could make a lot of money." [FN127]
  However, the oncoming flood of software-implemented business method patent applications will likely result in
insufficient novelty searches because (1) PTO software examiners are too *274 few and too inexperienced and (2)
the PTO currently lacks the ability to conduct sufficient prior art searches.  With respect to the PTO's software
examiners, Robert R. Sachs states that "[e]xaminers, many of whom are young engineers, simply do not have
sufficient expertise to evaluate patents which cover Internet business models." [FN128]  "Either they don't realize
that what is being patented is simply some old idea being done on the Net . . . or they don't have access to resources
that would evidence this." [FN129]  The PTO, in an attempt to address this concern, has approximately seventy-five
computer scientists on staff [FN130] and recently hired twenty new examiners for the division that reviews e-
commerce patents. [FN131]  However, hiring twenty new examiners simply is not enough in light of the mass
filings. [FN132]  Also, the PTO lacks sufficient prior art to assess Internet innovations. [FN133]  "Since software
was not considered patentable until recently, there is no database covering the first thirty years or so of software
development to help agencies make novelty and obviousness judgments." [FN134]  Further, corporations are reticent
to open up their software archives to the PTO because most software is currently protected by trade secret. [FN135]
  As a result of these inadequate searches, the PTO is issuing, and will continue to issue, invalid patents. [FN136]
For example, CyberGold asserts that it has the exclusive right to pay online consumers incentives to view
advertisements [FN137] and Priceline. com argues that it has the exclusive right to run reverse seller auctions where
the buyer sets the price. [FN138]  Both of these software-related business methods are merely old methods of doing
*275 business implemented in a new forum--the Internet. [FN139]  Thus, allowing patent protection for such
methods basically ignores the novelty and non-obviousness patentability requirements. [FN140]  Other examples
include CyberGold's patents for electronic shopping carts, [FN141] Health Hero Network's on-line auctions with bid
pooling, [FN142] Priceline.com's online brokerage system, [FN143]  and Walker Digital's online connection of users
of professional services to professionals who can offer the needed services. [FN144]
  The logical consequence of invalid patents being issued at an alarming rate is an increase in patent litigation and a
consequent decrease of confidence in the patent system. [FN145]  Many lawsuits have already been filed, including
Coolsavings.com's infringement suit over a method of distributing coupons over the Internet, [FN146]
Priceline.com's October 1999 suit against Microsoft for infringement of its patent that allows consumers to bid for
plane tickets and hotel rooms, [FN147] and Amazon.com's accusation against its rival, Barnes and Noble, of
copying its patented one-click technology. [FN148]  One danger resulting from this "torrent of lawsuits" [FN149] is
that litigation will result in an undeserved windfall to some and create delay and hassle to the majority. [FN150]
Specific *276 concern surrounds smaller companies trying to stay afloat in a world of ever-changing e-commerce.
While some commentators suggest that e-commerce patents will allow small companies to "protect themselves
against large companies trying to steal their innovations," [FN151] others argue that e-commerce patents will place
start- ups "at the mercy of large companies with software patents." [FN152]  Patent litigation is expensive, thus a
larger business's protracted challenge of validity and scope can effectively wipe out a smaller company.
  Also, the lawsuit bonanza harkens back to the 1960s when patent protection meant little because litigated patents
were invalidated more often than they were upheld.  The Reagan administration's creation of the Federal Circuit and
the subsequent court's establishment of a uniform body of law with a pro-patent slant ended the era of lack of
consumer confidence.  Mass invalidation of e-commerce patents will likely return the country to its pre- Federal
Circuit mindset of distrust of the PTO and the patents it issues.  This deterioration of the patent system may trickle
down to the national economy since "patents are the backbone of much of the national economy." [FN153]
V In Light of the Potentially Negative Long-Term Effects of State Street, Was
the Decision Correct?
  Although experts disagree as to whether State Street marked the beginning of a new era of patent protection, the
possibility that State Street will have a disastrous effect on the national economy forces one to consider whether the
Federal Circuit's decision was the right one.  Because the underlying goal of patent law is to foster innovation, a
determination of whether the decision was correct requires an examination of whether patent protection *277 for
software-implemented business methods was necessary to spur innovation. [FN154]
A. Forms of Intellectual Property Protection Available Before State Street
  In order to judge the effect that patent protection will have on encouraging innovation in the area of software-
implemented business methods, one must consider the various forms of intellectual property protection available
before State Street.
  The most commonly used form of protection was trade secret.  Because it can protect an idea even if it does not
rise to the level of inventiveness required by patent law [FN155] and lasts as long as the trade secret is not publicly
known, [FN156] trade secret protection offers broad, long-term protection. Also, because no public document filings
are required, obtaining trade secret protection is relatively inexpensive. [FN157]  However, trade secret's
requirement that the invention remain absolutely confidential places an onerous burden on the inventor. [FN158]
This burden is especially large for software inventions since the value of software increases with distribution and
because confidentiality agreements are tedious and cumbersome. [FN159] Finally, trade secret offers no protection
against independent invention. [FN160]
  Another common method of intellectual property protection which has historically been used for software is
copyright.  Copyright protects the expression of an idea (i.e., the specific software code language), rather than the
idea itself. [FN161]  Thus, in terms of software, copyright guards only against literal copying of the source code,
whereas patents protect against use of the notion of the software (e.g., the notion of a spreadsheet application as
opposed to the source code specifically used to implement the idea). [FN162]  Since only literal copying represents
infringement, *278 copyright protection does not protect against independent development or reverse engineering.
[FN163]  Yet, two benefits of copyright protection are that it lasts seventy-five years after the author's death and that
it is available for a mere twenty-five dollars.  In contrast, patent protection lasts only twenty years from the date of
filing and costs thousands of dollars. [FN164]  Due to the "awkward fit" [FN165] of copyright law to computer
software, much legal uncertainty still exists as to the software elements that are available for protection. [FN166]
This uncertainty causes apprehension for patent practitioners and corporations alike.
  The remaining method of protection, trademark, has been rarely used because of its limited benefits.  Specifically,
it does not protect the functional aspects of software and thus conveys limited protection. [FN167]
  Patents offer many benefits that these forms of protection are unable to provide.  Perhaps most importantly, patents
allow corporations to license their technology and thus to share in the revenue of competitors. [FN168]  Not only is
cross-licensing prevalent in the world of business, [FN169] this practice has the potential to generate tremendous
profits.  For example, IBM generates over one billion dollars annually from licensing. [FN170]  Also, obtaining
patent protection can be especially beneficial to start-up companies seeking funding since many venture capitalists
refuse to provide funding in the absence of such protection. [FN171]  At a minimum, a patent portfolio allows
fledgling companies to receive more funding since patents enhance a company's market value. [FN172]  For
example, Internet Incentives announced that it was awarded a *279 patent and then received $17.25 million in new
funding. [FN173]  Finally, many corporations seek patent protection as a defensive strategy to deter others from
entering their markets and to guard against infringement suits by other patent-laden companies. [FN174]  No matter
which benefit is sought, patent protection should be carefully considered by most businesses since "your competitors
are using software patents to gain a business advantage, shouldn't you?" [FN175]
B. A Discussion of Whether Patent Protection is Necessary to Promot Innovation
  Many patent commentators assert that these benefits, available only under patent law, are "critical to the growth of
e-commerce." [FN176]  In fact, some go so far as to state that "[w]ithout patent protection of the fruits of one's
labor, there is no incentive to innovate." [FN177]  Christopher Cantzler explains this reasoning as follows: greater
predictability occasioned by national uniformity will result in greater predictability for protection, which results in
increased incentive to innovate. [FN178]  Thus, some argue, "protecting intellectual capital is the only way to
generate more of it." [FN179]  However, others disagree with this logic and argue that patent protection "grants an
unreasonable advantage to the authors of existing software and unduly restricts future innovation in the field."
[FN180]
  It is difficult to deny that many corporations will derive beneficial short- term effects as a result of the State Street
decision.  Further, State Sreet represented strong precedent to allow truly novel and non-obvious software-
implemented business methods patentable status.  Such precedent, although long in the making, was the legally
correct decision.  However, the likely long-term effects of the decision include a flood of new patent applications
that the PTO is "ill prepared to handle" and which "the PTO may be tempted to issue . . . too easily." [FN181]  This
may result in the *280 mass issuance of invalid patents and a rapid deterioration of consumer confidence in the U.S.
patent system.  In order to avoid this detrimental result, the Federal Circuit must narrow the overly lenient State
Street holding "in order to meet the complex and unique needs of the computer software industry." [FN182]  The
Federal Circuit must take into account the almost thirty-year lag time between the first uses of software-
implemented business methods and the recent patentable subject matter precedent.  The court's current blissful
ignorance of the tremendous lag time and the resulting wholly inadequate prior art databases accessible to the PTO
will result in a return to the weak patent system of the 1960s.  Ignorance will not be blissful for long.
  Although some commentators assert that broad patent protection is necessary to foster innovation, the required
precedential narrowing would not unduly impair such incentive because sufficient motivation for creativity lies in
the prospect of profit.  This is evidenced by the precedent-setting rate of Internet growth in the past ten years, during
which time patent protection for software-implemented business methods was not generally available.  Further, the
support of innovation through a limited monopoly was originally intended to allow the inventor sufficient time to
recoup his research and development expenses and make some profit from his technological advancement.  E-
commerce does not require the depth of research and development necessitated by many schisms of technology.  In
fact, Internet businesses can be started for $100 or less. [FN183]  Thus, perhaps the original intent of patent law is
not served by granting broad protection rights where limited recoupment is necessary.
  The PTO appears to recognize its current inadequacies and has taken steps toward remedying them by hiring more
examiners and issuing training manuals specifically for use when examiners consider the patentability of computer-
related inventions. [FN184]  Either the Federal Circuit or Congress must provide the PTO with sufficient time to
remedy the thirty-year lag in prior art access.  *281 Without such patience, the current stability of the United States
patent is in jeopardy.
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